

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday 29 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

(Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. N. PETROV

Mr. D. TEHOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL IMRU

Ato YIRGA TESHOME

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.V. PURUSHOTTAM

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. AHMED OSMAN

Mr. M.S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the one hundred and fifty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before I give the floor to the first speaker, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to document ENDC/114/Rev.1, dated August 27, 1963, which is the Report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly drafted by our two co-Chairmen. I understand that the representative of the United States, acting in his capacity as one of our co-Chairmen, would like to speak on this item.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): After the informal meeting in which the Committee discussed the first draft of this report, the co-Chairmen met and, acting along the line of some of the suggestions which were made, prepared the present document, which we recommend to the Committee for adoption.

The changes consist essentially of the following. In the fourth paragraph of the English language version on page 3 there is a change intended to meet the spirit of the suggestions made by the representatives of Sweden, Burma and Mexico and the spirit of one of the recommendations made by the representative of Italy. This consists of adding the phrase "and with the aims proclaimed by the negotiating parties in the preamble to the treaty" to what had previously been the language with reference to the initialling of the nuclear test ban treaty.

Along the line of changes suggested by the representative of Canada, the report was reorganized so that the procedural arrangements now appear on the last page.

The only other point that needs to be referred to is that the representative of Mexico, at our informal meeting, proposed that other language be added to what is now paragraph D. of section V. which would make clear the scope of the phrase "disarmament items", or that there be an interpretation by the co-Chairmen of what we considered to be covered by this phrase. We felt that his point would be met by a simple statement from us that the word "disarmament" in the phrase "disarmament items" includes collateral measures.

That is all I wish to say, and, as the United States co-Chairman, I strongly recommend to the Committee the adoption of this report.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I am sure that I speak for the whole Committee when I express our gratitude to the co-Chairmen for the accommodating spirit in which they received the suggestions which were put forward informally by members of this Committee. Does any representative wish to speak on the report?

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): While associating myself with what you have said, Mr. Chairman, concerning the work which the two co-Chairmen have done for us, my delegation cannot refrain from reminding the Committee at this juncture of the reservations which it felt it necessary to make earlier as regards the fixing of the date for the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva.

The document which has been submitted to us gives no date for the resumption of our work and I regret that very much. It has been asserted that the fixing of a date might, so to speak, limit the discussions on disarmament which are to take place at the United Nations. Of course, my delegation does not wish in any way to limit those discussions. On the contrary, it is most anxious that they should be full and fruitful and give a strong impetus to our Committee's work. That does not prevent my delegation from thinking that it would have been very useful to fix forthwith, at least in principle, a date for the resumption of our work in November, after the close of the discussion on disarmament at the United Nations. That is the procedure we followed last year. My delegation would have been happy to see such a useful precedent maintained and followed this year also.

Indeed, several delegations around this table were in favour of fixing a date. However, in view of the very formal, categorical and gratifying assurances given by the two co-Chairmen -- for which we are most grateful to them -- that there will be no unnecessary delay in the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva, the Italian delegation does not oppose the approval of the text of the report as submitted to us.

It nevertheless wishes to point out that its insistence on fixing a date for the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee is due to the fact that it considers that work to be of the greatest importance and urgency for the conclusion of those further specific agreements on disarmament which we now regard as possible after the signature of the treaty imposing a partial ban on nuclear tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and thanks to the new atmosphere which that treaty has created in this Committee and in international relations.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): If no other representative wishes to speak on this we shall consider the document adopted.

The draft report (ENDC/114/Rev.1) was adopted.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): In accordance with the established programme of work, (ENDC/PV.150, p.22) today we are discussing collateral measures. At the same time we are holding today the last meeting in the present session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Romanian delegation avails itself of this opportunity to restate briefly its position with regard to collateral measures before making certain general remarks on our labours here. We want to stress from the very beginning that we share the viewpoint expressed at our meeting of 22 August by the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, according to whom:

"... that it is still our fundamental duty never to lose sight, during our discussion of the various items on our agenda, of our principal goal of achieving the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in accordance with the instructions we have received from the General Assembly of the United Nations."

(ENDC/PV.154, p.19)

I am certain that I shall not be stating a commonplace when I say that our constant and unabated efforts must be directed in the future towards the fulfilment of the fundamental task, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. At the same time, our attention must also be directed towards the adoption of partial measures aimed at reducing the danger of war breaking out, and at facilitating the implementation of general and complete disarmament, measures conducive to the relaxation of the international situation, measures likely to promote confidence among States and among peoples.

It goes without saying that between general and complete disarmament, as the main task, and the collateral measures there is a continuous and mutual influence and interdependence. The international situation is permanently changing; the issues of general and complete disarmament and those concerning collateral measures undergo ceaseless developments, but their inter-relation persists, and their specific weight endures as well. We are not denying, in any way or under any circumstances, the importance of collateral measures, but that importance we see only in relation to the solution of the main task, general and complete disarmament.

Let me dwell now on collateral measures. The decisive criterion in selecting such measures and in establishing the priority to be given to their examination in our Committee should be determined by considering whether the debate on the issue

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and the subsequent adoption of the respective measure leads to the lessening of international tension, to the improvement of the political climate in general, and to general and complete disarmament, for the continuation of the struggle for the implementation of general and complete disarmament stands in the forefront as a vital demand of all peoples.

Proceeding from this criterion, the Romanian delegation is of the opinion that what we have to investigate first in our study of collateral measures is the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the one hand and the States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty on the other. What determines this priority? What are the objective causes and conditions which demand this priority? We have before us a pact for peace, an international agreement, against which, naturally, no Government aware of the international situation and conscious of its responsibility vis-à-vis its own people and humanity at large, can possibly stand out. A solemn undertaking not to start war against another State amounts only to a reinforcement, by restatement, of the general obligation incumbent upon all States, by virtue of international law and the United Nations Charter, not to resort to the use or threat of force in relations between States.

Opinions expressed in this Committee were that we should turn first to those measures which can be most easily implemented. In these circumstances we agree to that principle. We believe that of all the measures proposed here the conclusion of a NATO-Warsaw Treaty Pact (ENDC/77) is the easiest one to achieve. Indeed in regard to this measure no difficulties can arise in connexion with securing efficient control, in connexion with the balance of power or preventing the acquisition of unilateral advantages. Here there is no need for any control, and the possibility of upsetting the existing balance of power is nil. This is so for the simple reason that no single gun will be dismantled, no single cartridge will be destroyed, no single military unit will be disbanded, no single soldier will be demobilized. It cannot be objected that such a measure might affect the conventional relationships established between a certain great Power and some of its allies. The existing groups are still there. These are characteristic advantages of a measure whose implementation does not harm anybody but is profitable to all.

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A NATO-Warsaw Treaty Pact would be beneficial for all peoples. It is true that from a technical and legal point of view this pact would appear to be limited to certain States. But the reality is different. Because of the great influence exerted by the two groups over international relations in general -- in regard to the economic potentialities of the States concerned, the area of their territory, their population numbers, their political, cultural and economic relations with all other countries -- a non-aggression pact between the NATO Powers and the States members of the Warsaw Treaty acquires world significance.

We can only consider as a good omen the interest evinced by many governments -- for instance the Governments of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico and other countries -- regarding the prospects of concluding a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact. That is a proof of the fact that the proposed measure is not an artificial excogitation severed from the realities of life, but a measure which answers a real need, one which mirrors the will for peace of the peoples of the States directly concerned, the desire of all peoples for tranquillity and the establishment of a climate of security.

Another measure which deserves our fullest attention is that of cutting down the military budgets of States, or at least freezing them. It is known that from an economic point of view military expenditure represents a burden which weighs heavily upon the shoulders of all peoples and upon all States. Even the peoples of the countries which do not take part in the armaments race are, at least indirectly, its victims. Huge economic resources which could be otherwise employed for peaceful ends and for their benefit are now swallowed up by expenditure meant to bolster the number and the continuous modernization of armaments, and, first and foremost, of nuclear weapons. The Romanian delegation is firmly in favour of adopting certain measures for reducing, or at least freezing, the military budgets of States, and is in favour of this measure being given a leading place on the list of burning issues to be discussed in our Committee.

It appears to us that there are no specific objective difficulties in the way of implementing this measure. It is obvious that the balance of power cannot be jeopardized by a measure that does not in the least affect the present level of armaments and armed forces. Further than that, it appears to us that precisely in the situation where the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain have ceased nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which required expenditures amounting to many million dollars, it is now possible for States

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substantially to reduce, or at least to freeze, their military budgets. It is hardly necessary to demonstrate how this measure will be received by the peoples. It is certain that it will be regarded as a new step forward on the path of slowing down the armaments race and eventually curbing it completely.

The Government of the Romanian People's Republic attaches particular importance to the proposals to establish denuclearized zones in various parts of the globe. Such zones, zones from which and towards which nuclear weapons strikes will not be allowed, where maintenance, stockpiling, storing, production, transport, use or testing of nuclear weapons would be prohibited, represent a foreshadowing of the world liberated from the nuclear nightmare, of a world which will have got tangibly nearer to the state of general and complete disarmament.

We stress once again that it is precisely the nuclear danger that makes the problem of disarmament the cardinal issue of contemporary international life and that, consequently, everything that is of a nature to bring us nearer the elimination of nuclear weapons, completely and for all time, can only foster the attainment of our main target. Undoubtedly, the establishment of denuclearized zones would answer the desire of the peoples to see the area of nuclear danger being limited. In the establishment of denuclearized zones the peoples would also greet the promotion of the idea of eliminating military bases on foreign territories and, above all, prohibiting the use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. It is not hard to sense the organic link between the prospects of creating denuclearized zones in various parts of the world and the desire of the peoples to witness the slowing down of the armaments race, the freezing and reduction of the outlays of resources and human energy as well as of economic means for purposes other than peaceful ones. In brief, the creation of certain denuclearized zones would represent a significant factor of peace and security, an important link in the complex of measures aiming at the elimination of nuclear danger, and would throw into gear an action whose final outcome may well be the turning of the whole of our globe into a vast zone with no place for the most destructive weapons which are threatening mankind.

Those are specifically the positive elements which make the peoples embrace the idea of denuclearized zones and which inspire an ever greater number of governments to speak out in favour of and to militate for the establishment of such zones. With

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regard to Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), the Mediterranean area (ENDC/91), Africa (ENDC/93/Rev.1), Latin America (ENDC/87), Northern Europe (A/RES/1664(XVI)) and other regions, plans have been submitted for the establishment of denuclearized zones. These plans are now at various stages of being implemented and sanctioned politically and legally. That is a proof of the viability of the proposed measure, of the fact that those proposals are firmly anchored in the realities of contemporary international life, and that they are consonant with the aspirations of the peoples for peace and international security.

Those are the reasons which prompted the Government of the Romanian People's Republic to put forward and to maintain its known proposals of 10 September 1957, re-stated on 6 July 1959, for turning the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation, without nuclear weapons and missile launching pads, a zone of peaceful labour for the benefit of the peoples of that region and in the interests of general peace. The proposals made six years ago in regard to the Balkan area entirely preserve their burning interest. Implementation of those proposals would ensure new conditions for developing peaceful co-operation for the benefit of all peoples living in that part of the world and would constitute a contribution to the cause of universal peace.

There are also other concrete collateral measures which have been submitted to this Committee and which, in turn, are to be subjected to a detailed examination. I am referring first of all to some of the proposals regarding the prevention of a surprise attack.

"This brief review of some of the collateral measures under discussion here appears to me sufficient to prove the amplitude, complexity and importance of the tasks confronting us. This conclusion urges us that today, when we are holding the 156th plenary meeting of our Committee, we should take a look backward to enable us to proceed forward.

I should like to record once again my agreement with the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, when he stated at our last meeting:

"We have established a good working foundation on which we can now build the great edifices of the future." (ENDC/PV.154, p.21)

There is a working site with plans and blueprints, and with planks and beams and, why not say it, the skilled workmen ready. But the great effort begins from now on: it is the building that has to be erected. The goals we are pursuing are difficult, complex and daring. Their attainment requires patience, perseverance and political

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clear-sightedness. Above all, they require that all States give proof of their desire and resolve to overcome all obstacles and to hoist high on the edifice of general and complete disarmament the banner of victory, the banner of peace.

During the 156 meetings at which we have been working here we have not scored the results that were desired and expected by the peoples, but what we have obtained is tangible proof of the fact that the difficult issues of general disarmament can and must be negotiated, as well as proof of the fact that mutually acceptable solutions can be found.

General and complete disarmament under strict international control is an imperative challenge of our time. Disarmament must be the fruit of co-operation and negotiation. It cannot be imposed by anybody upon anyone. Disarmament must be useful to all peoples, to all States. It cannot give advantage to anybody. Disarmament must signify the triumph of reason, peace and security. It cannot be against man, against life.

An ancient Latin adage says: "Festina Lente", but Virgil in his Georgics took care to correct that adage by saying: "Fugit irreparabile tempus ...".

As regards our proceedings, I agree that we must examine and negotiate every issue in all earnest, sparing neither effort nor time. But neither can we postpone indefinitely the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

On this account I should like to recall that the historic resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, unanimously adopted on 20 November 1959 (A/RES/1378) proclaimed general and complete disarmament as the task requiring speediest implementation. Four years have passed since then. The armaments drive did not stop during this lapse of time. On the contrary, it went on gaining momentum. The experts on the matter state that in our time the overall destruction capacity waxes double every two to three years. That means that today we have more than twice the amount of the means of destroying people and the material and cultural assets wrought by them than at the time when the General Assembly adopted its resolution on general and complete disarmament. It is clear that disarmament is more urgently demanded now than it was in 1959.

The Romanian delegation expresses its hope and conviction that the issues of disarmament and those linked to them will be amply discussed in the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly and that proposals will emerge, solutions will be found and resolutions will be voted which will move forward the negotiations so as to bring us nearer our final goal: the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

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Full of optimism, and strongly convinced that in the world today there are forces capable of safeguarding mankind from the catastrophe of a nuclear conflagration, the Romanian people and its Government will make in the future their full contribution to the struggle for the triumph of peace all over the world. We express the hope that the spirit which has developed in our Committee, particularly of late, will also reign supreme in the proceedings in New York.

It is with this hope that the delegation of the Romanian People's Republic is leaving this hall today. It is in this spirit that I pay homage to you, Mr. Chairman, to our co-Chairmen, and to all my colleagues around this table. I wish to thank the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and I also extend my thanks to the whole staff of the Secretariat, both visible and invisible, whose painstaking and competent work has created good conditions for our negotiations.

Mr. MEHTA (India): We are now coming to the end of our work in the present session. Though perhaps the shortest in length of time, it is gratifying that this session has proved so promising in terms of our hopes and aspirations for the future.

Our present session opened on the welcome news of the Moscow agreement on a nuclear test ban (ENDC/100/Rev.1), which has been widely acclaimed throughout the world as an event of historic importance. This agreement has been hailed not only for lifting the burden of anxiety over continued pollution of the atmosphere, but also in the hope that it would help to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons and limit the development of new weapons of mass destruction and thus lead to a slowing down of the arms race. But, above all, it has been hailed as a significant first step towards a relaxation of international tensions and a promising move towards purposeful measures of world peace and disarmament. Its importance does not lie so much in what the treaty actually says as in what it means and the hopes it arouses. In this lies its real significance.

A beginning has at last been made in an area in which nearly two decades of talks produced almost nothing but fear and frustration. Now, for the first time, there is reason for hope that shifts in the thinking of the leaders on both sides

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make possible a beginning along the road to peace. The partial test ban treaty is the initial expression of that possibility, and what is more heartening is the sense of recognition on both sides that the momentum should be kept up and that other practical agreements between East and West should be sought while the real significance of the test ban agreement is still clearly in focus. There is no denying that, in the last analysis, this agreement was reached simply because both sides came to recognize that since neither could gain military supremacy over the other in this nuclear age and a continued arms race provided no real security, they must learn to live together in peace, and they could do so only if they began reducing the existing tensions and dangers. This basic purpose and meaning behind the agreement, however, may soon be obscured if the first step is not followed by others.

We are realistic enough to comprehend that the agreement on the test ban could not lead overnight to a settlement of all the other outstanding issues that have poisoned the relations between East and West over the years. But we take hope from the fact that both sides recognize the opportunities offered by the new atmosphere of goodwill which now pervades the international scene, and their evident seriousness and concern for the search for new areas of agreement on measures which might ease international tensions, reduce the risk of war, and build up mutual confidence, paving the way to agreements on general and complete disarmament.

There is no lack of proposals before the Committee in this field, and during our recent meetings, the representatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union have outlined their respective ideas for collateral measures to reduce the existing tensions and the risk of war. Speaking generally of these proposals, Mr. Stelle said at our meeting held on 12 August:

"An exchange of views on such proposals could lead us to a better understanding of which measures would be most susceptible to future agreements ..." (ENDC/PV.150, p.6)

(Mr. Mehta, India)

Again, Mr. Tsarapkin, speaking on the same subject, said at our meeting on 16 August:

"The Soviet Union considers that in the present state of international affairs it is necessary to take speedy, effective and, if possible, simple measures with which a start could be made and which would have a favourable influence upon the further development of mutual relations between States belonging to the two opposing military groupings." (ENDC/PV.152, p.9).

We are fully in agreement with these views.

On his part, the Soviet representative has emphasized that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries should be the next step to improve the international situation and promote the growth of mutual confidence. Speaking of how the proposed non-aggression pact might be formulated, Mr. Tsarapkin said at our meeting on 16 August:

"It seems to us that this question should not now embarrass our Western partners to any extent, since the Soviet Government has recently stated that this problem could be settled to the mutual satisfaction of both sides." (ibid p.11)

If this implies greater emphasis on the importance of the content of any such arrangement rather than its form -- and we believe it does -- that would be a significant factor pertinent to the present consideration of the matter. As we know, some discussion on the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact has already taken place in Moscow, and Mr. Stelle has informed us on 16 August that, as agreed to in Moscow, consultations with their allies on this question with the purpose of achieving a mutually satisfactory agreement, have already begun (ibid. p.38). It is reassuring that the matter is being pursued, and we hope that positive results will follow. Our views on the subject are well known. We have already indicated that non-aggression pacts are to be welcomed wherever they can be applied because they help to lessen the danger of war and promote a peaceful and tolerant atmosphere.

We have also had a useful exchange of views on some of the measures designed to reduce the risk of unintentional war and surprise attack; and we are encouraged to see some similarity of approach on that question. Both sides have moved from their previously held positions on the substance of the problem and we are hopeful as a result of what Mr. Tsarapkin said at our meeting on 16 August:

"Life, however, does not stand still and we are prepared to introduce the appropriate changes required." (ibid., p.15)

(Mr. Mehta, India)

We realize that differences still exist. The United States would prefer to deal with the possibility of establishing ground observation posts at key points on the basis of reciprocity as a single measure, while the Soviet Union would like this exchange of posts to be associated with its proposal about the thinning out of foreign troops on both sides of the dividing line in Germany and the exchange of observers with these forces. Nevertheless, elements of a common approach are evident and these differences, we feel, are negotiable and capable of being resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. We hope that further talks now envisaged between the great Powers to discuss follow-up steps to the test ban treaty will yield an early agreement on those arrangements.

There are other United States suggestions aimed at reducing the risk of accidental war, and we also have some proposals by other delegations under consideration as a practical means for reducing tensions. Among those are the freezing or reduction of military budgets and the creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world. These deserve careful and detailed examination. We also have a proposal submitted by the representative of Mexico about prohibiting the placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons (ENDC/98) and he has recently stressed its early consideration. Then again, there is the problem concerning dissemination of nuclear weapons to which the representative of Brazil has also referred. In fact, the measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons is a priority item for discussion recommended by the co-Chairmen last year, and it will be recalled that, for several years, the United Nations General Assembly has also adopted resolutions against the spread of nuclear weapons --- on occasions with the support of the nuclear Powers present here. One therefore wonders why this subject has not figured in our recent considerations. There seems to be a considerable degree of similarity in the actual provisions on this question contained in both the United States (ENDC/30) and the Soviet Union disarmament plans, (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and it is to be hoped that this matter can be pursued with urgency. An agreement on this important issue would ensure non-proliferation of nuclear capability and would seem to be a natural follow-up to the test ban agreement.

Finally, there is the unfinished task concerning the nuclear test ban. The preamble to the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) makes it clear that the goal remains a comprehensive ban on all tests, including those conducted underground; and the three nuclear Powers are pledged to continue to work towards this end. The representatives of Mexico and

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Brazil have already drawn attention to this and there is also a reference to this matter in the statement of the Government of Romania on a test ban agreement which the representative of Romania read out in the Committee on 20 August (ENDC/111). May we hope that, at an opportune moment, the threads of negotiations on this subject will be picked up again with the aim of reaching an agreement also on banning nuclear tests.

It has been the consistent view of my delegation that in the search for further ways of reducing tension and eliminating the risk of war no subject should be excluded from our survey. In the context, however, of the unhappy background of international developments in recent times, it is obvious that all proposals and measures may not be equally susceptible to speedy agreements, and it may seem advisable that steps should be taken progressively, one after the other as opportunities unfold, which would help reduce international suspicion and tension. The tragedy of our time is principally that of fear and suspicion. Any measures which build up confidence, therefore, deserve the support of all peace-loving nations.

Before concluding, I should like, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, to turn to another matter -- this time of a personal nature. We all know that our distinguished co-Chairman, Mr. Stelle, is shortly leaving Geneva. Perhaps this is his last appearance in the Committee. With his long and intimate connexion with disarmament and the nuclear test ban talks, he has been a pillar of strength for our work, and we are very sorry indeed to see him go. But we are happy that he is leaving with the satisfaction of having played such an important role in the achievement of two historic events of international importance. I speak of course of the setting up of a direct communication link between Moscow and Washington (ENDC/97) and of the Moscow agreement on a nuclear test ban. We in our delegation have great admiration for Mr. Stelle's many qualities of head and heart, his statesmanlike negotiating skill, and his never-failing courtesy and quiet dignity. He has all our good wishes for the future and we wish him and his charming lady bon voyage.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The successful conclusion of the partial test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) has given us the right to hope that within a short time other important steps forward will follow on the road towards disarmament, or -- to use what in this context is the more appropriate terminology of the United Nations Charter -- towards "regulation of armaments". Such steps, we can now take for granted, will be discussed after the recess.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

My delegation regards it as highly valuable that at this intermediate session an opportunity has been given to the members of the Committee to ponder over some of the collateral measures which are next on the agenda (ENDC/52) of the Conference in more general terms without committing ourselves to firm positions.

Reviewing the lists of the suggested topics submitted by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union, with the addition of suggestions made by other representatives at this Conference, I think we can distinguish between some collateral measures which are of concern only to the great Powers and which will probably be agreed on a bilateral basis, and other measures with a potentially wider impact. It is my intention to deal only with the second category in my intervention today, that is, to discuss in a brief and preliminary way some collateral measures which can be of immediate interest also to nations not in the centre of world politics.

Our interest is twofold. One, the political aspect: how are the smaller nations going to become fully engaged in the struggle for disarmament? Another, the practical aspect: how can we make genuine contributions to the tasks before this Committee?

The Moscow treaty seems to give some very good pointers as to what measures might command the more general and unequivocal response: on one hand, measures which are applicable to a great number of States; and, on the other hand, measures where the difficulties of control are minimized.

To begin with, let me emphasize the importance of the last point, as the lesson to be drawn is of equal concern to the great Powers and those not so great. If we use the partial test ban treaty as a divining-rod it will lead us to the conclusion that there is greater hope for a successful meeting of minds -- if we concentrate attention on disarmament measures which, in the first instance, only call for control measures generally acceptable at present. This does not of course mean that other measures should always be shunned, but as long as the world lacks experience in jointly organized activities for checking military preparations, it seems more propitious to proceed along a smoother path.

The other conclusion seems to be equally clear: that the test ban treaty just signed had such a salutary effect because it appealed to a great number of States. Notwithstanding the fact that only the nuclear testing activities of three nations are primarily curtailed by the treaty obligations, great value should be attached to the fact that the treaty became internationalized. Thus, a number of States have become directly engaged, yes committed; I dare say, for the first time offered a chance to commit themselves to any obligation in the armaments regulation field.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

The question then arises whether a comparable degree of internationalization cannot be reached in connexion with some of the remaining partial measures. This question is left with my colleagues for consideration after the recess. We would, for example, very much want to know, in due time, from the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States how far, or how soon, they have envisaged that their proposals, repeated in recent statements, such as that of establishing control posts at transportation centres, should be applicable also to other countries. Or, in regard to another collateral measure proposed, namely advance notification of manoeuvres and major military deployments, it would be of interest to know if some more countries, perhaps in the first instance members of this Committee, would volunteer to subscribe to such an undertaking.

Of course, for practical reasons regional arrangements may sometimes be preferable to full internationalization. It seems to me that some of the collateral measures, aimed at reducing the risk of war, might well be undertaken on a regional level. If so, they can be tailored to the specific conditions of each case.

The most far-reaching of all measures classified as collateral is of course the one variously entitled "Measures to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons" and "Establishment of nuclear-free zones". This problem is in reality one of special concern to countries who do not belong to the club of great Powers. No doubt it will reappear in our continued deliberations after the recess. But as we have just now an opportunity for a more detached elucidation of the complexities involved in this problem, before delegations have to take up negotiating positions, I should like to attempt to draw a clearer demarcation line between the two approaches to this issue, indicated by the two sets of terms used and just mentioned by me.

They are both old acquaintances from the United Nations. When resolutions have been submitted recommending such measures in general terms the Swedish delegation has always voted for them: for example, for the so-called Irish resolution on measures to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons from its first presentation in 1958 (now Res. 1665/XVI); for the consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone in 1961 (Res. 1652/XVI); and for the so-called Undén-plan also in 1961 (Res. 1664/XVI).

The point I want to make -- for purposes of clarification of concepts rather than of positions -- is that there is a fairly considerable difference between these two approaches. The first one -- briefly referred to as "closing the atom club" -- aims at nothing less than a universal agreement, according to which, if we judge from present texts, on the one hand the nuclear Powers and on the other the hitherto nuclear-free

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

nations should, without other conditions than reciprocity, undertake not to engage in or facilitate the production or acquisition or control of nuclear weapons by States other than those which already possess such weapons. The second approach, briefly characterized instead as "opening a non-atom club" or creation of nuclear-free zones, allows a more gradual process. Without waiting for a universal agreement, individual States or groups of States are envisaged as taking initiatives in their own region for some degree of denuclearization. They can do so at a time of their own choosing, when inspired by the international ideal to build safeguards for peace and when not held back by considerations of national security interests. Thus, the characteristic feature of this approach is that it presupposes regional negotiations and permits decisions which might vary considerably in different parts of the world as to rules and conditions laid down. This was pointed out by the then Swedish foreign minister, Mr. Undén, in the United Nations in 1961 when he presented his suggestions -- which have later often been referred to as the "Undén-plan" (A/C.1/L.297 and Add 1, 2). He said:

"We realize that there might be different degrees to which one area or the other might be sealed off from nuclear weapons. It may well, therefore, be desirable to lay down different rules for atom-free zones in different parts of the world. A rule that might be appropriate for conditions in Africa would perhaps not be equally fit or applicable in Central Europe."

The ensuing resolution also contained a reference to this in its operative clause, requesting that an enquiry be made as to the conditions which different states might want to stipulate for adhering to a nuclear-free club. Or, in the words of the United Nations resolution:

"Taking note of the suggestion that an enquiry be made into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country." (A/RES/1664(XVI))

While the number of replies to the enquête conducted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations was encouragingly great and the replies often contained penetrating analyses, regrettably a few countries -- as far as I have been able to find, only

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

India, Japan and Sweden -- indicated certain conditions they wanted fulfilled, either for adherence in general or for accepting one or another of the specific obligations, the main condition being that a test-ban be achieved. My own country made its views on the conditions deemed necessary for adherence to a nuclear-free zone quite explicit.

Firstly, that it should include "the greatest possible number of States in Northern and Central Europe", which indicated that a certain relaxing of tensions in Central Europe should precede our taking a position in relation to the adherence of the Scandinavian countries to a nuclear-free zone.

Then there were certain time-limits set and specific conditions detailed, which may be of less interest in this context.

Finally, a pre-condition was to be that the Great Powers had agreed on a nuclear test-ban, my Government having in mind a comprehensive test-ban.

I have wanted to dwell on these matters in order to clarify the initial position from which the Swedish Government has judged the problems involved. But the purpose of my intervention has also been to underline the fact, in itself of positive value, that countries in different regions and different geopolitical situations can proceed at a different pace along the road to denuclearization. What I have said about Sweden may be typical for a country which, on the one hand, on account of its technological and industrial development always figures in lists of "potential" nuclear nth countries, and, on the other hand is situated, as it were, "under the trajectory" between the Great Power blocs. But the important feature of the regional approach to denuclearization is that reservations in one quarter do not restrain progress in another.

This whole approach has also already demonstrated its practicality. The 1959 agreement on Antarctica may be hailed as the original model. The recent actions taken by five Latin-American Governments (ENDC/87) and by the African Chiefs of State, (ENDC/93/Rev.1) meeting in Addis Ababa, to promote denuclearization of their respective regions, further testify to the inherent value in this approach. But it must once more be emphasized that it is a matter directly for the States concerned to conduct the

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

negotiations and discuss the rules for the establishment of a denuclearized zone as well as to lay down the compensations or guarantees they want to obtain from the nuclear Powers. This Conference would hardly be the place to negotiate but can and should of course elaborate the principles involved, register any progress made and extend our best wishes to those countries who are pioneering in this field of disarmament, which is of such direct concern to the smaller nations.

When utilizing the opportunity given us, at this particular stopping-place in our work, to review in more general terms some of the partial measures on which the attention of the smaller nations is naturally focussed, I should want to testify also to our interest in questions as to the control connected with the collateral measures of disarmament. So far these problems have not been raised in our preliminary deliberations, but I am sure that they will have to be tackled when, after the recess, we renew our negotiations in this Committee with revitalized zest. Thus, once more I am taking the opportunity to give advance notice in order to obtain replies at that later session from the principal negotiators and the originators of the proposals for various collateral measures as to who should be responsible for the control connected with each of the separate measures proposed, and how the control should be organized.

We all know that in relation to general and complete disarmament, according to the draft texts submitted both the the USA (ENDC/30) and the USSR (ENDC/2/Rev.1) delegations, the responsibility for control arrangements should be vested in the International Disarmament Organization. But in relation to collateral measures the question of the control machinery has rarely been broached; at the time of their prospective implementation no IDO would presumably exist, and we would have to envisage whether the control should be bilateral or multilateral, reciprocal or international.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

The present world tension and the armaments race, which is in itself both a cause for and a result of increasing tension, constitute a polarized problem. In so far as this problem can be eased by bilateral negotiations and bilateral solutions between the two main centrifugal forces on either side, the United States and the USSR, no nation need or should try to intervene. Our common aim here is surely to facilitate a détente and disarmament. But sooner or later questions of the degree of bilateral control or internationalization of control arrangements will have to be faced.

There seem to me to be three particular cases which might call for a multilateral approach. Firstly, in some instances a purely bilateral, or as it is sometimes called "adversary", control may prove insufficient. Here the Swedish view is a purely pragmatic one; wherever the control issue is not solved on a bilateral basis we should try to find the answer by either regional or international control arrangements.

Secondly: many of the disarmament measures are international by their very scope and nature. Further study might show that quite a few collateral measures are also. If so, international control would certainly be appropriate from the outset.

Thirdly: I would venture to state that it would be an international interest, properly to be voiced by a non-aligned country, that as soon as it is practically and politically feasible each disarmament measure should be open to some kind of international review, in order to provide knowledge as to what is going on in each sphere of disarmament.

Whenever, for any of these reasons, a higher degree of multilateralization of control is warranted, nations outside the Power blocs might be drawn upon to fulfil certain functions. The Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Nilsson, has in a recent speech, on 18 August, made a concrete suggestion in this direction. He indicated that outside personnel might be introduced already if control posts at traffic thoroughfares are to be established. While reciprocal or "adversary" control is limited and gives only two countries or groups of countries experience in the art of controlling, it might be useful to extend the practice field towards multilateral participation. But we are not, of course, seeking employment; we are only offering our services if and when they may be required.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

A development towards more and more internationalized control does not, however, necessarily call for such direct participation. Rather, it has for a long time been the view of my Government that particular merit should be attached to control measures which are of an indirect, built-in, automatic or semi-automatic nature. My colleagues will recall having heard us many a time on this subject, particularly with reference to the scientific monitoring of seismic events, but also on the general value of checking methods of a more abstract, objectified and passive character. I could give chapter and verse from speeches by Messrs. Edberg and von Flaten and by me of this preference of ours for "control" by indirect, non-military, non-political methods, simply by monitoring and following developments without any authority to interfere with them and without any possibility of arousing the suspicion that they are encroaching upon the security interests of sovereign States. As an example, besides the one of seismological observations, we would want to stress in the future work of the Committee the possibility of gaining insight into the trend of the armaments race -- is it going upwards or downwards? -- by comparative budget studies.

Preparatory studies in this field have as a matter of fact been recommended by the Swedish delegation every time a proposal has been made with reference to military expenditures. Our Foreign Minister at the time, Mr. Undén, said in the General Assembly in 1958, when a draft resolution was presented by the Soviet delegation, that we had insufficient information as to how the military budgets, obviously of very different structure in different countries, should be compared. He recommended a technical study in order to facilitate a future political decision on this important matter.

Well aware of the highly technical complexity of proposals relating to military expenditure -- whether such proposals aim directly at disarmament through budget reductions or at indirect checking by budget comparisons of developments with regard to armaments -- the Swedish delegation has attempted to scrutinise the problems somewhat more in detail and might be ready, at some appropriate time during our forthcoming work session, to submit a working paper.

In conclusion, what I have said today is no more than a brief outline of the type of problems which seem to command a special interest for countries who do not belong to the main parties to the negotiations but who, like them, are kindled by a strong desire to see the work on disarmament proceed energetically, realistically and thus effectively, within this Committee.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

Before the microphone in front of me is switched off, I want to join in what will most probably be a choir of good wishes for Mr. Stelle, who has represented his country at our Conference with such distinction. His clarity of style and his good humour have been great assets in our work and in our deliberations.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): At this our last meeting before we recess for the General Assembly, the Canadian delegation thought it would be useful to review the state of our work in this Committee. I propose first to discuss the position we have reached on our primary task -- which is to achieve an agreement on general and complete disarmament -- and secondly to discuss the position on initial or collateral measures to be implemented prior to a general disarmament agreement.

Our procedure for dealing with general and complete disarmament is based on recommendations of the co-Chairmen which are contained in document ENDC/52, as we all know. That agreement was dated 24 July 1962, and it is perhaps a little sobering for us to realize that it is a year and one month since it was reached and that our progress since that time has been, to say the least, rather limited. The co-Chairmen agreed on discussion of eleven topics listed in paragraph 5 of ENDC/52, which are lettered from (a) to (l). As delegates are well aware, we have only got as far as letter (e), with little agreement so far registered. At the same time we could take as a small credit the fact that there has been a fairly thorough exploration of the positions of the two sides, especially with regard to two important subjects -- items (b) and (c), the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles and limitation on conventional armaments.

The second paragraph of ENDC/52 states that

"The initial focus should be on the first stage of a treaty of general and complete disarmament ..."

I think we all agree this is a realistic way of proceeding. In fact it has become more and more obvious from our discussions during the past eighteen months that, while the ultimate purposes of the two sides are in a measure agreed on the ultimate purpose of general disarmament, the great problem is how to achieve the first stage of disarmament. Our discussion of stage I measures has shown that the immediate problem is how to start the process with the hope of continuing until the final desired result is achieved.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In addition to the comprehensive discussions we have had on items 5(b) and (c), we have had a rather useful exploration of the different positions on item 5(d), nuclear disarmament. We have also considered item (e), military bases, and, as a collateral measure, item (j), measures to reduce the risk of war. We have also touched on item (g), measures with regard to military expenditures.

The usefulness of our work on general and complete disarmament will be judged by the United Nations General Assembly both on the progress we have registered in this field and on the possibilities we can demonstrate for future advances. I think all of us here should be encouraged by the view expressed by U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his annual report to the General Assembly:

"The usefulness and timeliness of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been amply proved in the short span of its existence. The Committee provides an effective forum for harmonizing the responsibilities of the great Powers with the interests of other countries and thus of humanity as a whole. In conditions of reduced international tension and of improved political climate, the role of the Committee may become more significant than heretofore."

We hope that most other nations share the view of the United Nations Secretary-General in this respect, and if, as we hope, the role of our Conference is to become more significant, we here must think seriously about what we can do in our subsequent negotiations to overcome the obstacles that stand in the way of agreement on general and complete disarmament. Our colleagues from the Warsaw Pact countries have stressed that the prime objective to be achieved in the early stages of disarmament should be to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war. No one contests that this would be most desirable -- to free the world of the fear of a devastating nuclear war in which it now lives. But when we reflect on the subject we come to realize that to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war requires in fact the elimination of all wars. Any war between great Powers or their allies, if it were continued for long, would turn into a nuclear war. So to use as a yardstick for judging the usefulness of a first stage disarmament measure the proposition that "it must eliminate the threat of nuclear war" hardly seems realistic or desirable.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I entirely agree with the comment of the representative of Sweden at our meeting last Thursday 22 August, to the effect that if we say that a particular measure:

"... whether as a collateral measure or integrated at an early stage into a scheme for general and complete disarmament, does not limit the risks of a thermonuclear war, then we are, it would seem to me, being more than necessarily pessimistic, and perhaps even short-sighted." (ENDC/PV.154, p. 18)

I think it is essential that during the forthcoming recess all of us, particularly the great nuclear Powers, should use the opportunity to examine our respective disarmament positions and consider how we can increase our rate of progress. The crucial question is how the nuclear Powers can begin to reduce their present enormous armament in nuclear weapons vehicles and nuclear weapons. How this is to be done in relation to the reduction of conventional armaments and in accordance with the agreed principles of the maintenance of balance and verification has not yet been worked out, and it has become increasingly evident from our deliberations that agreement cannot be obtained on the proposals of either side as they now stand. Therefore, it is primarily for the nuclear Powers to see what changes they can make in their proposals to bring them more into line with the possibilities of agreement as things are in the world today.

When we resume our work in this Conference the Canadian delegation looks forward to three developments. First, I hope we shall have new proposals on how to achieve general and complete disarmament; second, I hope that we can revise our agenda in document ENDC/52 so as to enable us to examine comprehensively the most important problems in the process of achieving general disarmament; and third, I hope it will be possible to progress from the general level of discourse that has characterized our discussions to a detailed examination of technical difficulties and problems. This idea has been advanced by several other delegations here, as we know.

We support especially the view of the Swedish delegation that it is "... of paramount importance that we dig into technical subjects so that we know the answers when our political leaders feel that they can accept advice and conclusions from the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference." (ibid)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Turning now to matters other than general and complete disarmament, we all know that more than half our time since July 1962 has been taken up with a discussion of a nuclear test ban treaty -- and that has now happily been achieved, at least as far as testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space is concerned. There remains, of course, the problem of eliminating nuclear testing in the fourth environment -- underground. It would seem that the solution of this last problem must wait on further developments. There might possibly be an atmosphere of increased confidence which would lead to agreement on an adequate inspection system to ensure that no underground tests are taking place or, on the other hand, the development of seismic and related scientific procedures to a point where it is certain that underground testing can be identified from outside the territories of nuclear Powers with the same precision that tests in the other three environments can now be detected and identified. Representatives will no doubt have seen an article which appeared in the New York Times of 24 August 1963 which indicated encouraging progress in this matter. I am happy to say that Canada has been able to make a contribution to this important work.

We have also devoted a great part of our recent discussions to what we all call "collateral" measures. This has marked an important change in the work of this Eighteen-Nation Committee because, as the representative of Brazil pointed out at our meeting last Thursday, 22 August (ENDC/PV.154, p.20), this area of our work was neglected for some time. The increased emphasis which has recently been placed on collateral measures is encouraging because it reflects a growing realization that general disarmament must be preceded by confidence-building measures.

What is most important for the prospects of useful negotiations on our resumption here is that the major Powers should reconsider their present positions not only on disarmament but on preliminary measures as well. What is the next forward step that could be taken towards easing tensions and preparing the way for disarmament? In the view of the Canadian delegation that is a question which we must all consider.

The Canadian delegation believes it would be helpful to discuss, first of all, measures for reducing the risk of war by the establishment of observation posts, exchange of military missions, and other related measures. This I referred to at length in my statement of 16 August 1963 (ENDC/PV.152, p.29 et seq.) Other measures

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

which might be usefully discussed are those concerning the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and perhaps those concerning nuclear-free zones. We have heard some very pertinent observations concerning those measures in the speech which the representative of Sweden has just concluded and, as was mentioned, these two topics are likely to be considered at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. When we reassemble here we may have a better idea of the extent to which other nations are prepared to agree to such arrangements. There are other proposals which merit consideration, such as the prohibition of the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction. This is a subject which has been referred to by the representative of Mexico who recently submitted a text on the matter (ENDC/98).

As for the non-aggression pact on which our colleagues from the Warsaw Pact countries place such stress, it continues to be our view that this can best be negotiated outside this Committee.

When we resume our work we will need to renew our efforts to adopt an agreed agenda for collateral measures. The only procedural document we have on this subject is ENDC/C.1/2 of 2 April 1962, which consists of two parallel lists of preliminary measures submitted by the co-Chairmen. It is of little use because the co-Chairmen have not been able to agree on which of the items in those two lists should be discussed. No doubt the non-aligned members of this Conference will have further suggestions to make about an appropriate agenda on partial measures when we reassemble and during the recess. We ought to try, when we come back, to adopt orderly procedures which will enable us to focus attention on those subjects which will offer the best chances of agreement.

In closing I should like to say that although we have not achieved much progress during this most recent round of discussions the tone of our statements and even their content has greatly improved. No doubt this is because the "spirit of Moscow" which all have mentioned has fortunately continued to be present. All of us have a responsibility during the recess to search for ways in which we can continue the momentum achieved in Moscow so that we can get new agreements. In agreeing on the partial test ban the great Powers have demonstrated that there are areas in which both sides have a common interest in making agreements. Although we in this Conference represent countries with different political philosophies, we must continue to search for common ground and for areas where our interests coincide. We are present here because of one over-riding interest -- our desire for a peaceful and stable world. On this basis it should be possible to find ways to realize our common purpose.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation would like to join with others in saying a few words about the departure of Mr. Stelle. He has served the cause of disarmament with distinction for many years here in Geneva. All of us at this Conference are grateful for his contribution to our work. His wise counsel will be missed and we wish him every success in the future. As others have done, I should like to extend the thanks of the Canadian delegation to the representative of the Secretary-General, members of the Secretariat, the translators, the verbatim reporters, and all the United Nations personnel who make our work here possible.

Mr. SLIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): It is the conviction of the Czechoslovak delegation -- and in this we fully agree with the opinion of other delegations -- that in the work of the Committee the time has come to make more rapid progress and achieve tangible, positive results. As has already been stated by all members of the Committee, the necessary conditions for this have been brought about by the general improvement of the atmosphere in international relations, as a result of the signing of the treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1). At present more than sixty Governments of countries which have already signed the Moscow treaty have expressed their conviction that the success of the Moscow negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests has opened up the way to agreement on other international problems as well and that the signing of the treaty on the cessation of tests marks a decisive turning-point, particularly in the negotiations on disarmament, the actual results of which, from the point of view of our main objective, cannot yet be considered satisfactory. In saying this, I have no intention at all of minimizing the great significance and importance of the treaty on the cessation of tests or the agreement between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States on the establishment of a direct communications link. (ENDC/97)

But what are the main requisites by which the Committee should be guided when it resumes its work after the forthcoming recess in order that the opinions and hopes expressed by us and the long-cherished expectations of the peoples of the whole world should not again prove unjustified? In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the main prerequisite is that, in the Committee, as well as in international relations in general, the favourable atmosphere of the Moscow negotiations should be maintained

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

and that all of us who are gathered here round this table should display the maximum good will and understanding of the position of the other side and should seek for and, in the course of discussion, carefully weigh up all the possibilities of achieving agreement gradually on all problems of general and complete disarmament, which continues to be our main objective, as well as on some collateral measures, which might contribute to the accomplishment of the main objective.

The results of the Moscow negotiations have once again confirmed that, given sufficient interest, mutual understanding and good will on the part of all participants, it is possible to achieve acceptable agreements even on difficult international problems. It would be desirable that the example of the Moscow negotiations and the agreement achieved should serve as an inspiration to all the States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee without exception, so as to help bring about a considerable increase of their efforts in seeking for agreement on various questions of general and complete disarmament.

The Czechoslovak delegation further considers that in order to ensure the success of our work it is necessary that all member States without exception should take an active part in the work of the Committee on all the questions under consideration. Up to now, unfortunately, that has not always been the case.

With reference to the next stage of the work of the Committee, we are of the opinion that, if all delegations comply with the aforesaid requisites in their approach to the matter, in the present situation when mankind is constantly under the threat of a thermonuclear war, we should lay stress in the first place on making headway in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament in accordance with the Committee's procedure of work adopted in July last year. (ENDC/52) In the opinion of our delegation, on resuming our work we should discuss extensively the problem of military bases and foreign troops in other countries' territories. The discussions on that issue which have already taken place have shown how great would be the importance of its solution for improving the atmosphere in international relations and reducing the danger of a nuclear war. Great possibilities are beginning to show in the future, particularly in the field of so-called collateral measures which are of great importance for improving the atmosphere in international relations and creating favourable conditions for the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Almost all delegations in the Committee have pointed out in their statements that that field is relatively the most favourable one for reaching

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agreement. The delegations of the socialist countries, including the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, have already had the opportunity to express their views as to which questions in that field should be dealt with by the Committee.

As I have already had the opportunity of explaining in detail at our meeting of 16 August (ENDC/PV.152, p.23 et seq.) we give priority to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries. (ENDC/77) It is now a generally recognized fact, which was also expressed in the communique (ENDC/101) issued after the Moscow negotiations of the three great Powers, that such a measure would be of world-wide importance. In our Committee as well, the idea of a non-aggression pact has also received active support, especially from the non-aligned States, as their statements have shown, in particular, the statement of the Brazilian delegation at a previous meeting (ENDC/PV.154, pp.18 et seq.) and that of the Indian delegation at today's meeting (supra.p.15). We sincerely desire that the consultations announced at the conclusion of the Moscow negotiations should be completed as soon as possible and that definite negotiations on a pact should begin without delay.

Also of great importance, undoubtedly, would be the discussion and implementation of measures against surprise attack, especially the establishment of permanent ground posts as proposed by the Soviet Union, (ENDC/113, p.2) which could be implemented together with other disarmament measures. As the delegations of the NATO countries have also put forward similar proposals, it seems to us that here again there are chances of reaching agreement. Our delegation also supports the other proposals in the field of collateral measures submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union, as well as the various proposals relating to the creation of nuclear-free zones in the world. The Czechoslovak delegation, like the delegations of the other socialist countries, is also prepared to study carefully other proposals which have been or may be submitted in the field of collateral measures. But we are of the opinion that all those proposals must be fully in keeping with paragraph 2 of the agreed procedure of work of the Committee which was adopted in March last year. (ENDC/1/Add.1) That means that they should contribute to the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States and facilitating general and complete disarmament.

Permit me, in view of the favourable circumstances about which I spoke at the beginning of my statement, to express the deep conviction of our delegation that this time, when the Committee resumes its activities, there really will be progress in its

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

work and that we shall be able to achieve the tangible results which public opinion throughout the world expects from us. I wish to assure all members of the Committee that our delegation will do its utmost to achieve that aim.

In view of the fact that the United States representative in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, Mr. Stelle, is going to leave us to take up other work, I should like to express the sincere wish of myself and the Czechoslovak delegation that he may have great success in his future work.

In conclusion, I should like on behalf of my delegation to join those representatives who have already expressed their gratitude to the members of the Secretariat, to the representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and to his deputy, Mr. Epstein, for the assistance they have given us in our work.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In view of the fact that the clock is moving on and that there are several other speakers inscribed on the list, the United States delegation will forgo making the statement which it was prepared to give this morning. It consisted of an assessment of where we stand in our work, and several very able assessments have been made by previous speakers.

I should like to express my sincere gratitude for the kind remarks which have been addressed to me personally, and to assure the members of the Conference of the high personal regard in which I hold them. I should like also to express appreciation for the co-operation with the United States delegation of the other delegations of this Conference, and appreciation for the co-operation of my old and valued friend and colleague, Mr. Tsarapkin, in the work of the co-Chairmen. It is my hope and expectation that that co-operation with other delegations in the work of the Conference, and between the United States and Soviet co-Chairmen, will continue.

I should like, finally, to express the gratitude of my delegation to the representatives of the Secretary-General and to the Secretariat for the help which they so consistently give us in our work.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I am sure I speak for the Committee when I say we are grateful to Mr. Stelle for the consideration he has shown in this case, which is something, of course, that we have all come to expect of him.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): I cannot promise to be as brief as the last speaker, the United States representative, but I shall do my best.

On the eve of the adjournment of our work, the Polish delegation would like to state very briefly its views at this stage in the Committee's discussions.

I wish to say at the outset that, in our opinion, the time has not yet come to take stock of our deliberations and draw up a balance-sheet of our activities. We have only just begun the real debate. The exchange of views which we have had in recent weeks has been only of a very general nature. The exchange of views on the disarmament problem as a whole will now continue at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Polish delegation attaches the greatest importance to the participation of all the members of the international community in this discussion, which will, we hope, lead to the formulation of instructions that will guide our efforts when we meet again.

However, if it is too early to draw final conclusions, we can none the less single out certain features of the work of our Committee's last session. It seems to me that the most important fact which should be stressed at the present time is the rapprochement which has occurred between the views of delegations represented here on a number of problems. It is true that there are still fundamental differences between East and West as regards the methods of achieving general and complete disarmament. But it is also indisputable that we have succeeded in narrowing down the problem and defining the main elements. The Polish delegation is convinced -- and the recent debates have merely strengthened our conviction -- that the solution of the disarmament problem as a whole depends above all on agreement on atomic disarmament, and that once such an agreement has been reached, the solution of all the other problems should not present major difficulties.

We consider that the surest way to atomic disarmament lies in the destruction of all nuclear weapon vehicles during the first stage. We also think that the time has come to explore thoroughly all the possibilities opened up by the Soviet Union's proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional pp.38-40) that the two chief nuclear Powers should retain, on their own territory, a specified number of intercontinental missiles, with the appropriate anti-missile and anti-aircraft defences.

We have also succeeded in singling out the questions which, it is almost unanimously agreed, can now form the subject of fruitful negotiation. That fact alone is proof of progress. Matters on which it was impossible to negotiate yesterday seem

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

today to have become negotiable. If that is so it is because we all realize the growing importance of the so-called collateral measures and have succeeded in defining the areas in which practical and effective solutions are possible.

The Polish delegation is of the opinion that a series of political and military measures could be taken forthwith to reduce international tension and the risk of war, to increase confidence in East-West relations and to promote progress towards real disarmament. In this connexion, we believe that priority should be given to the draft non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty. (ENDC/77) We also attach the greatest importance to the measures designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack, to establish denuclearized zones, particularly in the most sensitive areas of the world, and to reduce the number of armed troops stationed in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

We should also turn our attention to the economic consequences of the armaments race and consider what measures can be taken forthwith to lessen the heavy burden of military expenditure.

For the first time since this Committee was set up, we are going to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations a report (ENDC/115) which describes not only discussions but agreements. The Committee has played an undeniable part in the conclusion of these agreements and has thereby justified the confidence placed in it by all the Members of the United Nations.

But although we have grounds for deriving some satisfaction from the present state of affairs, we should not forget that the results so far achieved are small in relation to the tasks entrusted to us and the objectives still to be reached. The break-through we have just made is only a small one. Without underestimating the tactical importance of this event, we should not forget the immensity of the tasks still to be accomplished. One battle has been won -- the battle for the cessation of nuclear tests. We must now go forward and exploit all the possibilities opened up by this victory.

It is true that the advocates of the cold war and an unbridled armaments race are not disarming. There are statesmen who fear any easing of tension and who bank on the maintenance of international unrest, and accession to the Moscow Treaty does not in every instance signify a desire to work for peace.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

We are all agreed, that important as it may be from the political and psychological point of view and for the protection of the health of present and future generations, the agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests concluded in Moscow (ENDC/10C/Rev.1) is only a first step which should be followed by other agreements.

This conviction makes it incumbent on us to seek together the best means of consolidating the ground that has been won and to prepare for the future. The proposals are there. Now it is necessary to negotiate in the spirit which prevailed at the Moscow Conference and with the same will to succeed.

Before concluding, I should like to associate myself with the tributes paid here to Mr. Stelle, the United States representative, who is leaving us. We wish him all success in the new tasks which will be entrusted to him.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): The cessation of tests has occupied a place of utmost importance in the attention of the non-aligned delegations at this Committee. As the most ripe and most symbolic collateral measure it was the logical starting point with which to begin the reversal of the arms race. Now that our Committee is satisfied that its efforts have been to some degree rewarded by the conclusion of a partial test ban treaty (ENDC/10C/Rev.1), it is the common understanding of all concerned that this step should be followed up with the discussion of, and, we hope, the agreement on, a few other ripe and practicable collateral measures -- measures which might start us gradually but determinedly on the road to general and complete disarmament.

It will no doubt be recalled that my delegation was among those non-aligned delegations which were particularly interested in giving urgent priority to the study of collateral measures. We believed -- and we reiterated this opinion on various occasions -- that collateral measures constituted the doorway to general and complete disarmament.

As we all know, the joint statement of Agreed Principles enjoins the disarmament negotiations, in paragraph 8, to --

"... seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date ... /on/ measures of disarmament ... without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme." (ENDC/5)

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

It was in accordance with this belief and in fulfilment of this particular requirement that my delegation, as the Committee will recall, sought on various occasions to provide compromise solutions for the procedural difficulties which stood in the way of agreement on a workable agenda of collateral measures. We were interested in reactivating the work of the Committee of the Whole by allocating equal time to the review of various Eastern and Western proposals and, later on, by suggesting that they might be discussed simultaneously or in parallel.

At the seventeenth session of the General Assembly my delegation was the original sponsor of resolution 1767 which called upon our Committee to give urgent attention to the study of collateral measures.

In May 1963 the Joint Communiqué issued by President Abdel Nasser and President Tito expressed their conviction that the goal of general and complete disarmament could best be attained by a series of partial and initial measures which should lead up to disarmament.

The Heads of African States meeting at Addis Ababa in May 1963 passed a resolution on general disarmament which specifically carried certain recommendations on collateral measures concerning, among other things, the cessation of tests and the denuclearization of the African continent in particular. The Ethiopian, Nigerian and the United Arab Republic delegations tables this resolution as an ENDC document. (ENDC/93/Rev.1)

Such is my delegation's keen awareness of the importance of the study in this Committee of collateral measures in general. More specifically, however, it will also be recalled that my delegation has never tired of bringing up before this Committee, from June 1962 onwards, the advisability, or at least the possibility, of studying a series of collateral measures in conjunction with one another, rather than individual unrelated collateral measures. We venture to suggest and to hope that, if taken together as an ensemble, certain collateral measures might assume more balance and become more practicable than if taken one by one.

On 10 June 1963 my delegation submitted a concrete proposal for a collateral measures "package arrangement" built around a test ban, and comprising also the prevention of further dissemination of nuclear weapons; the reduction of the risks of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications; and fourthly, by way of formalizing the two parties' peaceful intentions and their co-operation expressed in the afore-mentioned measures, a non-aggression agreement. (ENDC/PV.142, p.15 et seq.)

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

It may also be recalled that my delegation expressed the hope on that occasion that its collateral measures suggestion should be taken up by the nuclear Powers, together with its joint memorandum (ENDC/94) submitted together with Ethiopia and Nigeria, in their high-level tripartite talks in Moscow.

Developments since that time have only tended to vindicate our collateral measures concrete proposals as well as the idea inherent in them. Proposals for the implementation of a series of collateral measures have been coming from both East and West since 1959 or even before. More recently the Soviet Union's memorandum (A/4893) to the President of the General Assembly dated 26 September 1961 contained some eight such proposals. The Soviet Union in the same paper suggested that their implementation together, or at least the implementation of some of them together, might lead to the improvement of international relations.

The representative of the United States proposed on 19 June 1963 the implementation of an ensemble of four collateral measures. He said:

"The cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapon uses, combined with the transfer of significant quantities ... taken together with an arrangement to prevent the spreading of independent nuclear capabilities ... and with a test ban agreement, would mark a significant step ..." (ENDC/PV.146, p.20)

The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union on 16 August 1963 suggested the linking of certain partial disarmament measures with the Soviet proposal for the reduction of the risks of war by surprise attack. He said that the establishment of control posts would be an important measure "provided, of course, that it was combined with certain partial disarmament measures." (ENDC/PV.152, p.15)

It is worthy of note, as well as a source of gratification to my delegation, that our proposal about the advisability of seeking agreement on an ensemble of collateral measures has met with support from the delegations of Sweden and Canada as well as from other delegations in this Committee. So much for the idea of a package arrangement.

With reference to the contents of the package deal suggested by my delegation on 10 June, it is a source of particular pleasure to put on record that two of the four measures proposed are already agreed upon or on the way to agreement. We have a partial test ban treaty. And the three original signatories declared in the joint communique (ENDC/101) issued on that occasion their pledge to consult with their allies and to negotiate about a non-aggression agreement in good faith.

As for the two remaining components of our suggested package arrangement, namely the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications, we are happy to report that they are the common denominators of recent Eastern, Western and neutral proposals for ripe and practicable future steps to follow the test ban agreement.

Chairman Khrushchev's proposals of 19 July (ENDC/113) included one of the above-mentioned measures, and added the measures for denuclearized zones, freezing of military budgets, thinning out of troops, and emphasized the urgency of the non-aggression agreement.

Mr. Macmillan's three top priority measures, as he suggested on 9 August, were the reduction of the risk of surprise attack, the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, as well as the non-aggression accord.

Secretary-General U Thant recently gave his own ideas about possible next steps which, along with the two measures in question, comprise also the denuclearization of certain areas, the reduction of the number of missiles capable of being used in warfare, and finally the convening of a world conference about the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in warfare.

Each of the above broad categories is wide enough, complex enough and important enough to warrant constant exploration of their various subdivisions, or components, as well as possible variants or other possible applied forms thereof. The Committee's paying attention to the above-mentioned items or to some of them cannot exclude their study and discussion in other forums or by other channels. Nor can the Committee's study thereof preclude its paying attention to other proposals for collateral measures such as have been suggested by Eastern, Western or non-aligned sources. There is certainly no dearth of ideas and proposals. My delegation shares the view that we stand only to gain by giving the widest possible discussion to as many collateral measures as the two parties may wish to discuss, while at the same time fulfilling General Assembly resolution 1767 which called upon this Committee to give urgent attention to collateral measures.

After the preceding survey, and taking into account the latest proposals and views expressed and exchanged by the representatives of both sides at the beginning of this session, one can easily hope that there might be an agreement in principle on the following items:

1. the use of outer space for peaceful purposes;
2. the creation of denuclearized zones and the prevent of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
3. the non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries;
4. the reduction of the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation or failure of communications.

(Mr. Nassan, United Arab Republic)

As to the first item, the United Arab Republic delegation has since 1958 strongly advocated the use of outer space for peaceful purposes coupled with increased international co-operation under the aegis of the United Nations for the benefit of humanity. In this respect one can recall the resolution of the Conference of Non-aligned countries held in Belgrade from 1-6 September 1961:

"The participating countries call upon States in general, and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They expressed the hope that the international community will, through collective action, establish an international agency with a view to promote and co-ordinate the human actions in the field of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space."
(Documents and acts of the Belgrade Conference 1961, p.259)

This is why my delegation welcomes the very recent move, which was announced on 17 August 1963 from Washington and Moscow, about the agreements between the United States and the USSR for co-operating in an outer space research programme for meteorological and communications scientific researches. We hope that this scientific agreement will be followed by other steps towards a comprehensive agreement on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes on a wider international basis.

As to the second item, namely the question of the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and of its applied aspect, namely denuclearized zones, it is quite clear that it has gained more support recently not only among the nuclear Powers but among the non-aligned countries as well. The Latin American declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America (ENDC/87), and the resolution passed by the Summit Conference of Addis Ababa last May (ENDC/93/Rev.1) stating that Africa should be a nuclear-free zone, show the increasing interest among non-aligned States in this vital subject.

As to the third item, namely the non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, subsequent to the Moscow communique of 25 July 1963 (ENDC/101), and due to the circumstances relative to this subject and to the importance that many quarters attach to reaching such an agreement, members of this Committee are entitled to hope that both sides will find it possible to achieve a quick agreement satisfactory to all concerned.

As to the fourth item, namely the reduction of the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation or failure of communications, there are common and

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

general outlines of approach which could lead to a positive result, especially as both sides already agree in principle on the necessity of reaching an accord to reduce that danger.

It will be noticed that although agreement in principle on some of the collateral measures may lead to some understanding on gradual preliminary steps, yet this agreement is overshadowed by various degrees of hesitancy and diffidence which may be related to:

1. the priority which should be given to each collateral measure;
2. whether agreement on certain measures should be prior to, simultaneous with, or ulterior to the settlement of other related controversial issues;
3. the fear that the implementation of individual collateral measures might upset the balance or favour one party.

Seizing the opportunity of the unanimous will of both sides, after the signing of the partial test ban treaty, to do their utmost for lessening international tension and for facilitating the way for general and complete disarmament by seeking more agreements that might build up confidence and improve the atmosphere of discussion and negotiations, my delegation would hope once more to impress upon both parties the advisability, for the reasons that we have already outlined to this Committee, of the concept of a practical package deal on the basis of mutual accommodation.

I avail myself of this last opportunity in the course of our present session to associate myself with the expressions of appreciation which have been made with regard to the value of the institution of the co-Chairmanship which has proved its usefulness. I should like in this respect to pay a special tribute to our departing co-Chairman, Mr. Stelle, who has led his delegation ably and who has handled the tasks of the co-Chairmanship with his usual diplomatic skill. We all wish him luck in his future career. I would also like to express my delegation's gratitude for the many valuable services rendered to our Conference by all Secretariat members and especially by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, his Deputy and the members of his staff.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is today suspending its meetings after the approval of a further interim report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 17 April to 1 September 1963. (ENDC/114/Rev.1)

The most important positive achievement mentioned in this report is undoubtedly the signature of the Treaty of Moscow (ENDC/100/Rev.1) banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

The Mexican delegation remains firmly convinced that the putting of this Treaty into force and its maintenance in operation will be a contribution of incalculable importance to peace, not only because of its own contents but also because it marks a step towards the achievement of harder and greater tasks and because it can and must be the beginning of a chain reaction leading to further agreements to reduce international tension, avoid the risks of war and strengthen the maintenance of peace.

The objections which narrow sectors of opinion have raised to the Treaty and the fact that some Governments have not yet supported it show the difficulties that have to be overcome in order to settle differences, and the extent to which distrust and fear at times prevent recognition of the unquestionable advantages of this agreement and its salutary effects. Such an attitude is negative and unrealistic.

It is not possible to solve at a stroke all the problems which divide the Powers on this subject. In the present political atmosphere an agreement between them, even though partial and limited, is of great importance and facilitates the conclusion of other agreements. The Moscow Treaty does not eliminate all the dangers that threaten the world but it meets the universal desire that the nuclear Powers should refrain from continuing to contaminate our atmosphere with radioactivity and from endangering the health of present and future generations. It is not true that the Treaty reduces the national security of the Powers; on the contrary, it promotes general security and is to a considerable extent a brake on accelerated competition in nuclear weapons.

The attitude of the great Powers and of the other States which are members of this Disarmament Conference, as well as that of the General Assembly, must, we believe, be in favour of the conclusion of other agreements on specific subjects even though, like the Moscow Treaty, they are partial and limited. The main point is to move forward, even if it be step by step, along the road to disarmament and the maintenance of peace through negotiation and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

We feel sure that all States members of the Disarmament Committee hope that the great nuclear Powers will continue their efforts to conclude agreements on other specific points on which the possibility of agreement exists at the present time.

I refer in particular to the so-called collateral measures, some of which have been extensively studied at this Conference, such as the proposal concerning the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

The agreement concluded on 20 June between the Soviet Government and the United States Government regarding the establishment of a direct communications link (ENDC/97) is an encouraging step which must be followed by others directed towards the same goal.

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact is another matter on which progress could be made in the immediate future. I stated my views on this subject as follows at our meeting, of 30 July:

"It may be that the great Powers will at some future date reach an agreement embodying a solemn pledge of non-aggression. We believe that this non-aggression pact should be extended to all the Members of the United Nations, which could co-operate in reducing international tension by adopting a declaration in the General Assembly constituting a solemn reaffirmation of the obligations assumed in the Charter, a declaration which would be justified by the present international atmosphere and political circumstances."

(ENDC/PV.148, p.29)

A pact which committed the parties to refrain from resorting to aggression and to resolving their disputes solely by peaceful means, through negotiations or the application of the other procedures laid down in the Charter of the United Nations would be in essence a treaty on pacific settlement.

I have stated Mexico's views on this subject on various occasions in the General Assembly. Exactly ten years ago, in September 1953, at the eighth session, I drew attention to the need to build up a real system for the pacific settlement of disputes, in order to fulfil the purposes of the Charter. Allow me to quote some paragraphs from the suggestion which I made to the United Nations on that subject ten years ago:

"Without a genuine peace system or an adequate body of rules based on the principle set forth in Article 2, paragraph 3, and other articles of the Charter, we shall never have peace in the true sense of the term, by which I mean a state of tranquillity and confidence in a legal system which will be universally respected and will provide the necessary means to ensure that no dispute fails to find a peaceful solution..."

"In that connexion I should like once again to call attention to the example set by the republics of the New World. The Charter of the Organization of American States does not, like the charters of other regional

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

bodies, merely pay lip-service to the principle of the pacific solution of disputes; on the contrary, it states in article 23:

"A special treaty will establish adequate procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes and will determine the appropriate means for their application, so that no dispute between American States shall fail of definitive settlement within a reasonable period."

"As many of us well know, that principle was followed to the letter by the same conference which adopted the Bogotá Charter, when it drew up the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement. That instrument, also known as the Bogotá Pact, provides that any international dispute must necessarily, in the fullest meaning of that adverb, be solved by pacific means, including, in the final instance, compulsory settlement by the International Court of Justice or, where that court is not competent, by arbitration.

"The famous rule of the inviolable sanctity of the law is nowhere better exemplified than in the Bogotá Pact, a monument to American legal skill. I shall not trespass on your patience by further reference to that pact, and I merely bring it to the notice of those who are not familiar with the legal institutions of the New World as an example of what we can and must do in the international sphere in order to achieve a genuine organization of peace."

(A/PV.447, paras.118-120)

We are all acquainted with the draft non-aggression pact submitted by the Soviet Union in document ENDC/77. The essential part of that draft pact is contained in its first three articles which establish the obligation for the parties to refrain from resorting to aggression and to resolve disputes by peaceful means.

Article I of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, known as the Bogota Pact, states:

"The High Contracting Parties, solemnly reaffirming their commitments made in earlier international conventions and declarations as well as in the Charter of the United Nations, agree to refrain from the threat or the use of force, or from any other means of coercion for the settlement of their controversies, and to have recourse at all times to pacific procedures."

Disregard for, violation or abuse of human rights and the rights of peoples, and unlawful intervention in the affairs of others are the starting-point of international conflicts.

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A non-aggression pact is an undertaking given by the parties not to interfere in the affairs of others and to respect their rights.

Distrust and fear have compelled Governments to obey the motto: "If you want peace, prepare for war". We in Mexico believe that Juárez's advice should become a norm of universal conduct, being convinced that "among nations as among individuals, respect for the rights of others constitutes peace".

Our Committee's report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly (ENDC/115) contains, among others, a section (III) entitled "Measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States and facilitating general and complete disarmament".

Among the documents mentioned in this section and annexed to the report is a working paper (ENDC/98) which, on behalf of the Mexican delegation, I submitted to this Committee for its consideration on 21 June 1963; this document contains an outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons.

Section III of the report I have just mentioned refers to measures which could be agreed to prior to, and which would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament. (ENDC/115, p.4)

At our meeting of 22 August, the Italian representative, Ambassador Cavalletti, in his interesting statement, expressed the following views which I feel it is appropriate to mention now: I quote:

"If we had the wisdom to concentrate our efforts on those parts of the existing proposals which are alike, while putting the others aside for the time being, we could achieve agreements which, though limited, would be effective. Such agreements are, in my opinion, within our reach." (ENDC/PV.154, p.7)

He added:

"Other proposals which have received the support of the non-aligned delegations deserve consideration. I have in mind, for example, the proposal to prohibit the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons, which has been particularly stressed by the Mexican representative who has already submitted a text on the subject. (ENDC/98)

The recent agreement on co-operation in outer space concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union gives ground for hope that understandings between the two great nuclear Powers can even extend to the military sphere, so that the skies may be the scene of scientific co-operation and not of terrifying military competition." (ibid., p.8)

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

In this connexion I should like, before we separate on the eve of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, to make some observations on the problem dealt with in the draft treaty which I submitted on 21 June (ENDC/98) and to refer also, in connexion with this problem, to the subjects of nuclear disarmament and military bases which are referred to in paragraphs 5 (d) and 5 (e) respectively and which we discussed this month. (ENDC/52)

Bases exist both in national territory and in foreign territory and in the future military bases may be established in outer space. What is the difference, from the strategic point of view, between the various military bases according to the site where they are established? There are serious differences of opinion between the Western and the socialist Powers concerning the nature of foreign and national bases, as well as concerning the appropriate time and procedure for their reduction, elimination or destruction at the various stages of disarmament. This problem is being considered at present by this Eighteen-Nation Committee in connexion with paragraph 5(e) of our procedure of work.

I should like now to refer to a problem which might be taken in conjunction both with paragraph 5(d), nuclear disarmament, and paragraph 5(e), military bases. This problem is stated in paragraph 5(h) of our working paper (ENDC/52) which refers to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.

During the discussion of paragraph 5(e) it was stated that military bases in foreign territory involved a threat to use force and an increase in international tension, mistrust and fear of a war through accident or surprise attack.

It was also stated that the importance of military bases depends on the weapons with which they are equipped and that the existence or concentration of weapons, equipment and forces in a base, whether national or foreign, have a similar military potential for defence or attack and meet the need for balance, security and defence.

The principle accepted by both parties that the military balance should not be altered would be violated by the establishment of new bases, and that is what the placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons would amount to. Such a measure by one side would be met by a similar measure by the other side.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

It may be asked how a missile stationed in outer space and equipped with nuclear weapons would be treated. Would it constitute a national base in an environment which is not national? In what way would it affect the military balance between the Powers? What would be its effect on the disarmament measures laid down in the two draft treaties submitted to us by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Corr.1) and the United States of America? (ENDC/30, Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3) Both parties, in their respective drafts, state that the purpose is to reduce and ultimately to eliminate existing military bases. There is all the more reason for them to seek ways of preventing the possible establishment of bases in outer space, where as yet there are fortunately no missiles equipped with nuclear weapons. Space bases, fixed or mobile, would increase insecurity in general and that of the Powers in particular. Their existence would increase the fear and risk of accidental or surprise attacks. They would constitute a military measure incompatible with denuclearized zones and with the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons; they would give fresh impetus to the armaments race. The mere suspicion or fear that some Power might put nuclear weapons into orbit or station them in space moreover constitutes a serious threat to the indefinite maintenance in force of the Moscow Treaty.(ENDC/100/Rev.1)

Both Powers agree in recognizing the need to prohibit the putting into orbit or stationing in space of nuclear weapons. Both the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1) in its articles 14 and 15, and the United States draft treaty, in section D of stage 1 (ENDC/30), contain similar provisions establishing such a prohibition. We therefore feel confident that they will be able to give reasonable priority to the consideration of this problem, so that it may be one more subject of agreement between them in the near future, following the positive agreements already reached as regards the establishment of the direct communications link between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of America (ENDC/97), and in the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that the great Powers, during the remainder of this year, will find it possible to conclude three further agreements or establish firm bases for them:

- (a) a pact on non-aggression and the pacific settlement of disputes;
- (b) an agreement prohibiting the placing in orbit or stationing in space of nuclear weapons;

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(c) an agreement containing new measures for preventing wars through surprise attack, miscalculation or failure of communications.

Life is short and time is brief. Negotiation and agreement are long and difficult. Opportunity is fleeting, but the political atmosphere is now propitious and the duty of the Powers, and just as our own duty, is clear. The world expects us to fulfil our duty.

I should like, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Mexican delegation, to join in the tribute so rightly paid to Ambassador Stelle by those who have spoken before me. I further wish to express my admiration of the extraordinary qualities which he displayed in the difficult negotiations on disarmament, as likewise my warm feelings of affection for him. We wish him every happiness and success.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) To begin with I should like to make some observations in connexion with what was said at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.155) by the representatives of the Western Powers on the question of foreign bases. Strictly speaking, they said nothing new. Once again they tried to make out that there was no difference between national means of defence and foreign military bases located on other countries' territories. In connexion with those statements, we should like to note once again that there is no problem of so-called national bases at all. There is no such question as a separate one in our negotiations. It has been invented by our Western partners in order to lump everything together, confuse the issue of foreign bases and thus avoid its solution. But the issue of foreign military bases does not disappear on that account; it continues to exist in the world as a ponderable, stark and visible reality, and the difference between national means of defence and foreign military bases is very substantial. I shall not go now into an explanation of this difference from the military, military-technical or administration standpoints. A good deal has already been said about that. I shall only point out the military and political aspects of the matter. First of all, it should be borne in mind that foreign military bases in other countries' territories are spring-boards for aggression, concentration points for attack, advanced far beyond the limits of national boundaries. Military bases in other countries' territories are dangerous hotbeds of military provocations; they are an instrument for interfering in the domestic affairs of other States. This aspect

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of the matter has already been pointed out on many occasions both here in the Committee and in the General Assembly, as well as in other bodies when the question of foreign military bases has been under discussion. The liquidation of these spring-boards for aggression will result in a considerable easing of the international situation and will undoubtedly contribute to strengthening the security of States. In fact, a State having no foreign military bases in its territory may, in the event of war, stand aloof from it and preserve its security; and the existence of that State's own means of defence or national bases, as the representatives of the Western Powers call them, will not in the least prevent it from doing so. But if foreign military bases are located in the territory of a State, then naturally those bases will inevitably become the target of a nuclear blow in the first hours or even minutes of a war and the country which has made its territory available for foreign military bases will thus find itself involved in the war within the first hours. That is the main difference between national means of defence and foreign bases in other countries' territories.

At our last meeting the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, as well as his Western colleagues, were unable to refute the important argument that the earliest liquidation of foreign military bases would only strengthen the security of the countries from which such bases would be eliminated. Everyone understands very well that a country which agrees to the implementation of such a measure as the liquidation of foreign bases in its territory will thereby avoid a thermonuclear blow which otherwise is bound to follow inevitably in the event of war.

In objecting to the Soviet proposals for the liquidation of foreign military bases, Mr. Burns said at our last meeting that the question whether those military bases constitute a threat to the security of the States on whose territory they are situated "is a matter which must lie in the judgment of the States concerned". (ENDC/PV.155, p.35) He described those bases as a means "for their collective security" (ibid.) But in reality everything looks quite different and not as the Canadian representative tries to picture it. The representative of Canada, as a General and as a political leader, obviously understands that a country which has adopted a policy aimed at non-participation in a war and, consequently, has no foreign military bases in its territory will enjoy security, since the territory of such a country will not become

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a target for nuclear missile blows and, conversely, a country which has made its territory available for foreign military bases and which has consequently adopted a policy aimed at participation in a war is no longer the master of its own security, because, by making its territory available for foreign military bases it thereby makes itself the target of a nuclear blow, the target of nuclear missile weapons in the event of war. In order to see that problem in its true light and in order to realize fully the consequences of the policy of making territories available for foreign military bases, I should like to remind Mr. Burns, as well as other representatives, of a recent statement made in that regard by the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Macnamara. Last February, in the Appropriations Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives, Mr. Macnamara, speaking of the main purpose of locating United States Bomarc missile bases in Canada, emphasized that although these missiles were obsolete they could be used - and I quote literally what he said - "to deflect the Soviet missile strike from other targets". What commendable frankness, is it not? - to expose Canada to a nuclear strike - and not only Canada but also, apparently, the territory of other countries, where United States nuclear missile bases are located - and so try to deflect the nuclear strike from the United States! We have already pointed out more than once that the governments of all the countries which make their territory available for the location of United States missiles with nuclear warheads should give serious thought to this aspect of the matter.

Much more could be said on the question of foreign bases and on the need to liquidate them right in the first stage of disarmament. We are still far from having said everything in our discussion on the liquidation of foreign military bases. This question must be solved in the first stage of disarmament and we shall return to this question when the Committee resumes its work. Those who are still opposed to the proposal for the liquidation of foreign military bases should understand that in our era of nuclear weapons and multi-megaton hydrogen bombs, in the era of the most complicated and highly developed electronic and radio-electronic technology, in the era of global and inter-continental ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons with exceptional accuracy to any target at any point of the globe within a matter of minutes, the security of States is, as it were, in inverse relationship to the degree and intensity of military preparations. The more accelerated the

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armaments race and the more intensive the military preparations, the greater will be the accumulation of modern military means of terrible destructive power which reduce the security of States to nil.

It can now be said quite definitely that the concept of building and ensuring the security of States by intensifying military preparations has become hopelessly obsolete and has reached its own negation. This concept not only does not ensure the security of States but, on the contrary, increases the threat of nuclear annihilation. It is obvious that the safeguarding of the security of States should not be sought for along the path of intensifying the armaments race or along the path of strengthening and expanding military blocs. In these days the solution of this problem is possible only along the path of general and complete disarmament. There is no other way of solving this problem. We are now on the threshold of a recess in our work in connexion with the forthcoming discussion of the disarmament question at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly. In this connexion, it seems appropriate to take a look at what has been done and at what remains to be done and how. All of us in the Committee have noted unanimously the great positive significance of the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on a partial prohibition of nuclear tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The conclusion of this Treaty shows that in these days, in the conditions of peaceful coexistence, it is possible to achieve a settlement of acute international problems. At the same time, we all realize that the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty is only a first step towards the lessening of international tension.

We note with satisfaction that all those who have spoken in the Committee recognize the need for us to redouble our efforts in order to develop further the success already achieved and to arrive at more important solutions towards a further easing of the international situation and towards general and complete disarmament. The conclusion of the Moscow Treaty had aroused among all the peoples throughout the world legitimate and great hopes that the cause of disarmament will begin to develop swiftly and become a reality and lead to the consolidation of peace on earth. But we must not forget the dangers and serious obstacles standing in the way of the achievement of this aim. We must not forget that there are powerful, though not insuperable, forces in the world which are actively opposing the very idea of disarmament and the implementation of measures aimed at putting it into practice. The influence and pressure of these forces have so far prevented us from reaching agreement on a

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disarmament plan or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States and facilitating general and complete disarmament.

Although we have all noted with deep satisfaction the first step taken in this direction, namely, the conclusion in Moscow of the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests, we must by no means stop there. The coming weeks and months must be used to the fullest extent for intensive negotiations aimed at achieving other more important successes in the cause of a further lessening of international tension and in the cause of general and complete disarmament. In this respect life itself and the interests of peace have placed in the forefront the problem of the implementation of measures aimed at eliminating completely the threat of a nuclear missile war or, as a first step, at least a substantial reduction of this threat.

For the solution of this problem, as a first step, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty would be of great significance. We should like to note with satisfaction that in addition to the socialist States the delegations of India, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil and a number of other delegations have spoken in support of this proposal (ENDC/77).

It is also necessary to reach agreement on measures for the prevention of surprise attack, for the reduction of troops in Germany, the creation of denuclearized zones, the renunciation by States of the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons in foreign territories, for the freezing or, better still, the reduction of military budgets and other measures which have already been mentioned here a number of times.

It is obvious that the most effective measures in respect of eliminating the danger of a nuclear missile war would be the immediate achievement of agreement on a plan for general and complete disarmament on the basis of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1). Under that treaty, in the very first stage of disarmament all means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be eliminated and all military bases in foreign territories liquidated; the armed forces of the main military Powers in the world - the USSR and the United States of America - would be reduced to the level of 1,900,000 men for each of those Powers and all conventional armaments would be reduced by 30 per cent. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is prepared to accept that nuclear disarmament

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should be fully accomplished in Stage I. And for this purpose we are prepared to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons and cease their production if the Western Powers agree to this and are prepared to do the same.

So far, unfortunately, we have not succeeded in reaching agreement with the Western Powers on any of these important points. They have still not changed their attitude. To all these proposals, whether taken separately or together, they have one reply and one argument, namely, that the implementation of these proposals would upset the defence system of the West and give a military advantage to the socialist countries. But, to tell the truth, this is not an argument, but rather an unproved assertion unsupported by any facts and not in agreement with the facts. To oppose disarmament measures under the pretext that their implementation would upset the structure of military alliances and blocs is not at all compatible with the idea of disarmament. We hope that after the disarmament problem has been considered by the General Assembly our Western partners will return to this Committee with a new and constructive approach to the subject of general and complete disarmament and will manifest a genuine spirit of co-operation in agreeing on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States and facilitating general and complete disarmament. The Soviet delegation, for its part, will do everything possible for the solution of these problems.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to thank all the participants in these negotiations for the assistance they have rendered in clarifying the positions of the sides on the issues forming the substance of our work. In this connexion, I should like especially to thank my co-Chairman, the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, for the efforts he has made towards agreement on both questions of substance and procedure on which we, as co-Chairmen, have reached agreement during the work of our Committee. In view of the fact that Mr. Stelle is leaving his post as United States representative in the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to wish him every success in his new activities, provided, of course, that his new activities will not be aimed at intensifying the armaments race, and to express the hope that the problems of general and complete disarmament and of other measures aimed at consolidating world peace will occupy an appropriate place in his future work.

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I should also like to express my gratitude to the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, as well as to his Deputy, Mr. Epstein, and to all the staff members of the Secretariat, translators, interpreters and the other technical personnel for the assistance they have given to the Committee day by day in the fulfilment of the tasks before it.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): However sorely tempted I may be to exercise my right of reply to the remarks made by our Soviet colleague in the course of his speech, you will be glad to know that I am far too considerate of the time of the Conference to wish to do so. In that context I shall merely remind the Committee of an English saying we have: "Hope springs eternal in the human breast". In that context I express the hope that when our Soviet colleague in a couple of months or so re-emerges from his own domestic "base" he will have acquired a fuller and more sympathetic understanding on the question of bases in particular and on the Western position as a whole.

When I signified to the Chairman that I wished to speak, I simply wanted to say two things. First, so far as the work of the session which is now concluding is concerned, I wish to express the gratitude of the United Kingdom Delegation to the representatives of the Secretary-General and to all the secretariat and members of the various technical services who have done so much, as they always do, to facilitate our task. Secondly, so far as our work is concerned, when we resume here in the autumn how much poorer we shall be in that we shall no longer enjoy the participation in our discussions of Mr. Charles Stelle.

It so happens that Mr. Stelle, Mr. Tsarapkin and I were three original representatives of our countries to the three-nation conference on the nuclear test ban treaty when it first met in 1958. I personally find it very hard to imagine a discussion on disarmament when I shall not find Mr. Stelle sitting by my side, nor hear his voice raised -- I think "raised" is not the right word -- but intervening quietly, constructively and effectively in our debates. I am quite sure that no one has ever worked harder or deserves better from those who also work for disarmament than our very distinguished and esteemed colleague from the United States.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should simply like to associate myself with the expressions of thanks to the Secretary-General's representative and to the staff of our Conference and with the tributes which several delegations have paid to Mr. Stelle who is leaving us to take up another important post. I have observed that the laudatory remarks concerning his work and the expressions of long-standing friendship included some by delegations which Mr. Stelle, despite his efforts, had not been able to convince of the soundness of the Western arguments. If such are the feelings of these delegations, it is easy to imagine the feelings of the Western delegations, and particularly the Italian Delegation, which on the contrary have had the advantage of co-operating with Mr. Stelle within the framework of Western solidarity and friendship.

We wholeheartedly regret Mr. Stelle's departure, while congratulating him on his new and very important appointment. Personally and on behalf of all my colleagues in the Italian delegation, I should like to wish Mr. Stelle and his charming wife a most brilliant future. We hope none the less that we shall meet again, here or elsewhere, still on the same friendly terms.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I am afraid I must ask for the indulgence of the Committee. One of the disadvantages of a Chairman is that he has to wait until everyone else has spoken. I would like to say a few words first in my capacity as representative of Burma and then in my capacity as Chairman. I promise to be brief in both capacities.

Speaking for my delegation, I would like to express the hope that the two agreements which we have been able to report to the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly, in the document which was unanimously approved earlier today by us (ENDC/114/Rev.1), will prove to be the precursors of a long and developing chain of agreements which even in this nuclear age will make this planet a safe place for human habitation. Coming after so many years of toil and frustration, these agreements have already done something to restore mankind's faith in his essential sanity and goodness. Basically valuable in themselves, these agreements have introduced a new and important element into the international situation, an element which, properly utilized, can help powerfully to produce new agreements and new solutions. This new element is a more propitious political climate than has existed for many a long year. The important

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thing to remember, however, is that this element must be made use of or it will gradually evaporate. It is like a young sapling; it must either grow into a tree or wither and perish; it cannot stand still. Let us all resolve, therefore, both at the General Assembly and here when we resume our deliberations, to make full and effective use of it. Let it not be said of us that we missed the bus, because experience teaches us that disarmament buses are few and far between.

We believe that, given continuing good will and the determination to succeed, it should be possible in the not too distant future to reach further agreements, particularly in the field of collateral and partial measures. This session has been brief. But it has been long enough to demonstrate to us that in the new atmosphere each side is prepared to look at the old proposals put forward by the other with something less than a jaundiced eye. That is most encouraging. We believe that progress can be made in regard to all of the collateral and partial measures which have been discussed by the Committee during this session. They are all, in our judgment, ripe for tackling.

For instance, we believe that the statement made here by Mr. Tsarapkin on 16 August (ENDC/PV.152, pp. 8-11) with regard to the formulation of the proposed non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw alliances (ENDC/77) should go a long way towards facilitating a solution, and that the conclusion of such a pact would make a great psychological impact on the entire world. Similarly, the recent explorations into measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack, and further measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation also seem to us to open up new possibilities of reaching most valuable solutions. It would also seem essential that the limited test ban treaty be backed up by measures to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, whether into new areas on the earth's surface or into new environments, and last but not least, by an agreement for the discontinuance of underground tests. This recital is incomplete, but it is sufficient to show the challenge we face and what is within sight.

I would now like to say a few words as the Chairman of the day. To begin with, I would like to associate myself with the tributes which have been paid to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, to Mr. Epstein, and to all the members of the Secretariat for their loyal and ready co-operation and support during this session. To one and all, visible and invisible, I express the thanks of all the members of this Committee.

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Several members have referred to the fact that when this Committee reassembles after the recess a familiar face will not be among us. I would like to take this opportunity to place on record the warm appreciation of the Burmese delegation to Mr. Stelle for the courtesy and consideration that he has always extended to us. As Chairman, I should be amiss if I did not pay tribute to the highly skilled and efficient, if unobtrusive manner in which he and his fellow co-Chairman, Mr. Tsarapkin, guided our proceedings. Mr. Stelle's valuable contribution to the cause of disarmament is now a matter of history. I am sure I speak for the entire Committee when I say that Mr. Stelle will be missed, and not only for the reasons just mentioned. Our very best wishes for their future success and happiness go to him and to Mrs. Stelle.

It now remains for me to wish all my distinguished colleagues a very pleasant and fruitful recess. I look forward to meeting them in New York, and failing that when we resume our work here.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): It was really my intention to speak this morning, but in view of the long list of speakers and the fact that my name was well down the list I decided not to inflict on the Committee my rather long prepared statement, but I assure them they will have it at some time in the future. We cannot resist the opportunity of placing on record our appreciation of the co-operation we have received from Mr. Stelle. We are really sorry to see him go, but we hope he will continue in his new field to show an active interest in our work here. We wish Mr. Stelle and his excellent lady a very good trip and a good time in the United States.

I would also like to express our appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and his able staff for continuing to provide us with excellent facilities here.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fifty-sixth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Barrington, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, Italy, Romania, India, Sweden, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Burma and Nigeria.

"The Conference adopted an interim progress report* on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 17 April 1963 to 1 September 1963, to be transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly.

"The Conference decided to recess beginning 1 September 1963 and empowered the two co-Chairmen, after consultation with the members of the Committee, to set a date for reconvening at Geneva no later than one week following the termination of the consideration of the nuclear testing and disarmament items at the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly."

The meeting rose at 2 p.m.

* ENDC/115